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FOREWORD 
The f o l l o w i n g  p a p e r  c o n t r i b u t e s  t o  t h e  Reg iona l  I s s u e s  P r o j e c r  
on  m e t r o p o l i t a n  change by p r o v i d i n g  new i n s i g h t s  i n t o  t h e  p r o c e s s  
o f  p r i v a t e  l o c a t i o n  i n  a n  u rban  sys tem.  The a u t h o r s  d e s c r i b e  a  
t h r e e - l e v e l  game w i t h  f a c i l i t y  c u s t o m e r s ,  f a c i l i t y  managers ,  and 
f a c i l i t y  deve lopers /owners  a s  a g e n t s .  The p a p e r  d e m o n s t r a t e s  t h e  
e x i s t e n c e  o f  a  s i m u l t a n e o u s  non-coopera t ive  e q u i l i b r i u m  among 
f a c i l i t y  managers / f i rms  and among f a c i l i t y  d e v e l o p e r s ,  f o r  a  g iven  
e q u i l i b r i u m  b e h a v i o r  o f  c u s t o m e r s .  The t h r e e  l e v e l s  o f  t h e  game 
are d e s i g n e d  t o  r e f l e c t  v a r i a t i o n s  i n  speed of  a d j u s t m e n t  between 
t h e  t h r e e  t y p e s  of  a g e n t s .  
h e  E. Andersson 
Leader  
Regional  I s s u e s  P r o j e c t  
ABSTRACT 
This paper describes the spatial distribution of customer 
demand, supply of customer services, and facility investment 
as the outcome of a three-level game-like interaction between 
customers (e.g., shoppers), suppliers (e.g., retailers) and 
developers (e.g., landlords). Suppliers in each center are 
assumed to compete with suppliers in all other centers. 
Similarly, the developers of each center compete with developers 
of all other centers. With this specification, multi-center 
equilibria of the Nash type are examined for suppliers on the 
one hand, and fc'r developers on the other. Sup~liers in a 
center decide about utilized floorspace and price level in the 
center. Developers of a center decide about available floor- 
space and rent level. 
The uncertain customer demand is specified in probabilistic 
terms,representing the suppliers' and developers' perception of 
customer behavior. An approach to estimate customer response 
patterns is presented and discussed. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Much of the work on facility location in the operations 
research field has been confined to cases where the objectives 
are deterministic. In this paper we are investigating the 
decision problem of facility operators (suppliers) and facility 
developers who perceive a probabilistic component in the choice 
of alternative facilities by customers or users. The users 
are assumed to make selections according to individual trade- 
offs between accessibility criteria and the intrinsic advantages 
of the facilities themselves, usually leading to non-linear 
relations at the aggregate level. 
The analysis focuses on location of and investments in 
private facilities, demand for floorspace by profit-motivated 
operators, and customers' demand for services supplied by faci- 
lity operators. As a consequence we identify different objec- 
tives for each of these three categories of agents and examine 
corresponding supply/demand equilibria. Previous work on this 
problen is marked by Lakshmanan and Eansen (1965), and Earris 
and F1ilson (1978). 
From the viewpoint of a planning authority, different 
criteria apply for the location of public facilities (Leonardi, 
1981a, b) as compared with private facilities (Roy and Johansson, 
1981). In the latter case the authorities must contemplate the 
competition between developers (owners) as well as between the 
operators of the facilities. We examine this problem by study- 
ing the existence and nature of non-cooperative (Nash) equilibria 
for each of these categories of competitors. 
Our analysis uses a leader-follower chain between developers 
and operators as well as between operators and customers. Special 
emphasis is devoted to customer behavior and estimation proce- 
dures to capture how customers adapt to changes in facility 
location, transportation costs, pricing policy, etc. 
1.1 Perceived and Estimated Behavior of Customers 
In the model framework presented, customers are demanding 
services from the facility operators whom we call suppliers; 
the latter are demanding floorspace which is supplied by 
developers. The customers are assumed to make their decisions 
without contemplating the effects their behavior may have on the 
decision-making of the suppliers and developers. The behavior 
of customers is estimated by means of a facility choice model 
based on information theory. The estimation procedure is des- 
cribed in section 4. It attempts to distinguish and identify 
"quantity" and "quality" components of attractiveness at facili- 
ties in each center. In addition, these components are function- 
ally separated from the "macro" accessibility influences between 
zones of origin and destination (Roy, 1983, Roy and Lesse, 1983b). 
The estimated customer model is assumed to reflect the 
way suppliers perceive the behavior of customers. An important 
feature of the customer model is a separation between (i) overall 
destination probabilities and (ii) the conditional probability 
of customers' zone of origin and income group, given each zone 
of destination. 
1.2 A Two-Level Oligopoly Structure 
The model is specified in such a way that the suppliers 
in each center have two decision variables; they select the size 
of floorspace and a price level for the goods and/or services -they 
supply. We assume that in each given centre the suppliers are 
maximizing t h e  p r o f i t s  i n  t h e  c e n t e r ,  g i v e n  t h e  d e c i s i o n  made by 
s u p p l i e r s  i n  o t h e r  c e n t e r s  and g iven  t h e i r  p e r c e p t i o n  o f  how cus-  
tomers  respond t o  t h e i r  d e c i s i o n s .  With t h e s e  assumpt ions  w e  have 
s p e c i f i e d  a  non-coopera t ive  compe t i t i on  between c e n t e r s ,  and f o r  
t h i s  game w e  examine t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  Nash e q u i l i b r i a ,  which w e  
d e f i n e  and c h a r a c t e r i z e  c o n t i n g e n t  on p r e v a i l i n g  p e r c e p t i o n s  
( Johansson ,  1 9 7 8 ) ,  c a r e f u l l y  a t t e m p t i n g  t o  d i s t i n g u i s h  between 
t h e  r u l e s  of  t h e  game and t h e  d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  how it is  played  
(Shubik ,  1 9 5 9 ) .  
The s u p p l i e r s  a n t i c i p a t e  t h e  mode o f  r e a c t i o n  of  cus tomers  
b u t  t a k e  t h e  d e c i s i o n s  of  deve lope r s  a s  g i v e n ,  implying customers 
a r e  f o l l o w e r s  v i s - a - v i s  s u p p l i e r s ,  and t h e  l a t t e r  a r e  f o l l o w e r s  
i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  d e v e l o p e r s .  T h i s  means t h a t  t h e  pe r ce ived  cus tomer  
b e h a v i o r  i s  embedded i n  t h e  p r o f i t  f u n c t i o n  o f  s u p p l i e r s ,  and t h e  
p e r c e i v e d  b eh av i o r  o f  t h e  l a t t e r  is  embedded i n  t h e  o b j e c t i v e  
f u n c t i o n s  o f  t h e  d e v e l o p e r s  ( i . e . ,  S t a c k e l b e r g  a n a l y s i s ) .  1 )  
Two d e c i s i o n  v a r i a b l e s  a r e  a s s i g n e d  t o  t h e  d e v e l o p e r s ;  i n  
each  c e n t e r  a  d e v e l o p e r  d e c i d e s  abou t  t h e  s i z e  o f  a v a i l a b l e  f l o o r -  
s p a c e  and t h e  r e n t  l e v e l  i n  t h e  c e n t e r .  The s i z e  of  a  c e n t e r  i s  
i n c r e a s e d  by means o f  inves tment .  The c h a r a c t e r  and " q u a l i t y "  
of  t h e  i n f r a s t r u c t u r e  i n  each  c e n t e r  is  p r e s p e c i f i e d .  Hence, new 
i n v e s t m e n t s  i n  a  g i v e n  c e n t e r  can i n c r e a s e  t h e  amount o f  i n f r a -  
s t r u c t u r e  c a p i t a l  i n  t h e  zone b u t  n o t  change i t s  c h a r a c t e r .  
Within t h e  s e t t i n g  o u t l i n e d ,  it becomes e s s e n t i a l  f o r  t h e  
p l a n n i n g  a u t h o r i t y  t o  e v a l u a t e  s t a t e s  o f  t h e  sys tem which c o n s t i t u t e  
s i m u l t a n eo u s  e q u i l i b r i a  f o r  a l l  t h r e e  c a t e g o r i e s  o f  a c t o r s .  
2 .  MULTI-CENTER NASH EQUILIBRIA FOR SUPPLIERS 
W e  s h a l l  s t u d y  a  sys tem wi th  M cus tomers  who v i s i t  s u p p l i e r  
c e n t e r s i n  which goods an d / o r  s e r v i c e s  a r e  s u p p l i e d  from f a c i l i t i e s  
l o c a t e d  i n  t h e  c e n t e r s ,  indexed by j. The cus tomer s '  zone of  
o r i g i n  is  indexed by i and t h e i r  income group  by k .  I n  o r d e r  t o  
d e s c r i b e  t h e  cus tomer  b eh av io r  w e  must i n t r o d u c e  t h e  s u p p l i e r s '  
d e c i s i o n  v a r i a b l e s :  
' ) T O  some e x t e n t  t h i s  r e f l e c t s  a  h i e r a r c h y  i n  which each a d j u s t -  
ment p r o c e s s  i s  embedded i n  a  r e l a t i v e l y  s een  s lower  p r o c e s s  
o f  change.  
W = amount of floorspace utilized by 
j suppliers in center j 
= (average) price level selected in 
center j 
In addition we introduce an exogenously given factor 
f = measure of local attractiveness 
reflecting convenience and comfort 
in center j 
2.1 Customer Behavior 
The total number of customers is M I  and the proportion of 
customers in origin zone i belonging to income group k is Oik. 
The following (estimated) parameters are used to describe the 
behavior of customers: 
C ijk average travel cost and time respectively 
and = between zone i and center j for customer 
tijk category k 
a k = relative "quantity" of the commodities 
and/or services purchased by income 
group k (compared with that of the 
lowest income group) 
'4 = parameter describing customers' price 
and travel cost sensitivity 
B = parameter describing customers' time 
sensitivity 
ik = parameter reflecting the origin constraint in the estimated customer model 
Since we are only studying a sector of the whole economy 
we are not interested in the absolute price levels, but the 
relation between prices in the different centers, and the trade- 
off between price level and travel costs. Therefore, the 
following average budget relation is used: 
where pi jk are the purchasing probabilities given in (4) below. 
The behavior of customers is described by probabilities 
Pijkl showing the likelihood of customers of type k and origin 
i visiting center j. Using Bayes' formula this probability is 
decomposed as follows in this study (see section 4) : 
where p ik/j denotes the conditional probability of customers in 
center j coming from zone i and belonging to income group k. 
We express this conditional probability as 
where fijk can be expressed in terms of the variables and para- 
meters introduced in ( 1  ) and (3) 
By pj"we denote the overall destination probability which is 
estimated as (see section 4) : 
where 8 and a are estimated parameters, and where a reflects 
how the scale of a center affects the overall destination 
attraction. 
The probabilities in ( 5 )  and (7) are assumed to reflect 
the suppliers' information about customer behavior. More 
specifically we make the following assumption about the 
suppliers' perception: 
Retailers evaluate their decisions about floor- 
space size, W and price, j , with the percep- tion that the conditional YJ~robabilities (A.  1 )  
'ik/ j remain fixed. 
We may observe that a change, A ,  in the price brings 
about a change expi-$a Ay.) in each fijk-term. This means that 
k 3 
the numerator and denominator in (5) will change approximately 
proportionally only if ak does not vary too much or if the 
Pik/ j -distribution is very peaked. 
2.2 Existence and Character of Nash Equilibrium 
The decision problem of suppliers is conceived as a com- 
petition among centers. We assume that the supplier profits at 
each center j are maximized contingent on the decisions in all 
other centers. Let the profit function of center j be 
* 
where w are costs proportional to the floorspace') And y costs j j 
proportional to the sales volume, andwhere TT and i- are profit j j * 
and rent per floorspace, respectively. M, wj and yj enter as 
exogenous parameters, W. and y are decision variables, and r 
3 j j 
is assumed to be fixed by developers. 
Proposition 1 :  Identify each zone as a decision- 
making unit selecting W from a closed interval j 
on the real line. Let for each zone the object- 
ive function be given by ( 8 ) , contingent on (A. 1 ) 
and let a < 1. Then for given rent levels and 
* 
prices yi > yi, there exists a unique Nash equi- 
librium j ~ .  1 .  
3 
Proof: A unique Nash equilibrium exists if (i) the decision 
sets are compact and convex, (ii) the profit function is con- 
tinuous in all variables, and (iii) strictly concave in W' j 
(e.g., Berge, 1957). Properties (i) and (ii) are obviously 
satisfied. Property (iii) can be demonstrated with the help 
of the first and second order derivatives 
"In order to simplify the algebra, we frequently set w = 0 . j 
- * - 
where K = Ma. (y . -y . ) , and a 
= IikpikIjak . j From (10) it j 1 3 3  
follows that the second order derivative is negative for a I 1, 
and the solution obtains for 
The situation described in Proposition 1 is illustrated by 
Figure 1, Case a. 
When a > 1 the function pi = pi (W, ) is quasi-concave in 
J J J  
Wi but the profit function is not. We observe from (10) that 
J 
for a > 1, p.(W.) has an inflection point at 
3 3 
where B = IkZj j f Wa[~fijlrl0 and where f is defined in (2). j 
This r?otivates the following proposition is illustrated 
by Case 5 in Figure 1 : 
Proposition 2: Let the assumptions in Proposition 1 
be retained, and consider the profit function 
* 3 .W = MIpijkak (yj-yj) (1-p . )  , where p < 1 represents 3 j 3 j 
the share taken for rents and wi = 0. With this 
J 
function there exists a Nash equilibrium, also for 
Outline of a Proof: We shall not show that the equilibrium is 
unique. Hence, instead of strict concavity (as in Proposition 
1) we shall only require quasi-concavity of each profit function 
(Berge, 1957). 5 . W  is obviously positive and nonotonically 
I j 
increasing, with the first order derivative 
The function is a fraction of K.p.(W.) and has a similar 
3 3  3 
inflection point as p.(W.). To the left of this point it is 
3 3  
positive, increasing and convex. To the right it is increasing 
and concave. Evid-ently, like p.(W.) it is quasi-concave. 
3 
In order to establish the existence of a Nash equilibrium 
for the price decisions we need a compact (closed and bounded) 
decision space for each zone. As a lower bound we can select 
* 
yj 2 yj . We can also prevent y from getting arbitrarily large, J 
since p -+ 0 as y + at a faster rate than that of y itself. J J J 
Case a r.W j 
Figure 1. Illustration of Proposition 1 (Case a) and 
Proposition 2 (Case b). 
A * 
Remark : R = MZpijkak(yj-yj), w = 0. J J 
Proposition 3: Identify each zone as a decision-making 
unit selecting y from a compact set, and let the J 
profit function be n;W; in ( a ) ,  given the assumption 
J J  
in A ) .  Then for given sizes Wi and given rents 
there exist an n-tuple (for n zonis) which con- 
J 
stitutes a Nash equilibrium such that 
Proof: The profit function is continuous and the decision set 
compact. Then it remains to show that the profit function is 
quasi-concave. We shall do this by examining the first and 
second order derivatives with respect to y 1. 
Let them be 
denoted by ll! and TI'! respectively 
1 3 
* 
where a j - 'ikPik/jak. For (y.-y.) small ll' > 0 and TI" < 0. 
A I I j j 
Profits increase until yi = yi. At this point TI: = 0 as seen 
A J J J by (1 2) . By inserting y; in (13) we can see that ll$ < 0 at 
A * 
this point. Since (y.-y.)q8(1-p.)a. - 1 = 0, and gj/3yj < 0, 
3  3  ] A  I 
it follows that ll' < 0 for y > j . Observing that IT' is con- j j 
tinuous, those facts imply that T . W  is quasi-concave. 
I j 
* 
From Proposition 3 we have that ($.-y.) = l/a.$e(~-~.). 
3  3  I 3  
Combining this with formula (11) one obtains the followipg 
relation between the rent level and the equilibrium solution 
for the choice of floorspace: 
A 
r =ci$.~/~.q8 forw = 0 ,  and j I I j 
fi = u;.a/[$0(r.+w.j] for w , 0 j I I I j 
In a dynamic context one may assume that prices can be 
adjusted almost instantaneously as new information becomes avail- 
able while decisions about location and size cannot be adjusted 
at the same speed. In such cases price decisions will be based 
on more accurate information than decisions about siting. These 
observations motivate Remark 1. 
Remark I :  Let all assumptions in ~roposition 3 hold, 
except (A.1). Add the assumption that retailers also 
perceive the effect of price changes on the conditional 
probabilities pikIj. Then the first order derivative 
ll ! becomes 
3  
2 
where m ( a . )  = C a P 
2 I ik k ik/j - a2 is the variance of the j 
average quantity of goods purchased per customer at j. 
Also in this case, the objective function exhibits quasi- 
concavity. 
The equilibrium price changes to be 
which will also imply a change of the rent level in formula (14). 
2.3 Monopoly and Collapse of the Spatial Structure 
The oligopolistic setting in the preceding subsection turns 
out to be essential for preserving the multi-center structure of 
solutions. If a single decision-maker controls all suppliers, 
the model generates a monopoly solution which utilizes only one 
center. 
Assume that a monopoly has the objective to maximize the 
sum of profits emanating from all centers, subject to spatial 
constraints W . <  Z The Lagrange function corresponding to this 
3- 1- 
problem is (for w = 0) j 
L = C(R.-r.)F7 - C X .  (W.-Z.) 
j 3 1  , 3 3 1  
a- 1 * 
where R = A . F . W  /EF~W; , = ~ ~ p ~ ~ / ~ a ~ ( y ~ - y ~ )  , j 3 3 1  
and 
The standard optimum conditions are 
where X = c ~ A ~ F ~ w L / L ~ F ~ w ;  has the form of an arithmetic mean. 
Proposition 4: Let there be one decision-maker who 
maximizes the total profits over all centers as speci- 
fied in (16). Moreover, let rent levels r > 0 and 
* j 
prices y > yj be given. Then, for non-identical centers, j 
the maximum is obtained by selecting only one center. 
Outline of a Proof: Observe t h a t  5 i n  ( 1 7 )  i s  a  weighted  mean. 
Hence, f o r  a t  l e a s t  one c e n t e r  k  w e  have A < 5. S i n c e  r . + A . > O  k - 3  3  
t h i s  i m p l i e s  a c c o r d i n g  t o  (17)  t h a t  W k = O .  Having obse rved  t h a t  
W = O f  we c a n  a p p l y  t h e  same argument f o r  s t i l l  a n o t h e r  c e n t e r ,  k  
and c o n t i n u e  t o  e l i m i n a t e  c e n t e r s  till o n l y  one i s  l e f t .  For  
t h i s  c e n t e r  t h e  p r o f i t  i s  A.W - r . W  
I j 3  j .  
Remark 2 ;  The r e s u l t  i n  P r o p o s i t i o n  4 c a n  be p r e v e n t e d  
i f  w e  i n t r o d u c e  c o n g e s t i o n  e f f e c t s  o r  a  s i m p l e  d e n s i t y  
c o n s t r a i n t  o f  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  t y p e  p.M/W.<d f o r  each j. 3  3- 
The s t a t e m e n t  o f  Remark 2 f o l l o w s  d i r e c t l y  from i n s p e c t i o n  of  
t h e  a s s o c i a t e  Lagrangean which becomes f o r  w = O  j 
- 
L = T ( R . - r . ) W  - L A .  ( W  -Zj) - f y j  (pjM/W.-d) I I j I j  I 
which y i e l d s  t h e  optimum c o n d i t i o n  
Remark 2 a l s o  r e f l e c t s  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  a  cus tomer  d e n s i t y  r e l a t i o n  
i s  l a c k i n g  i n  t h e  o l i g o p o l y  s i t u a t i o n .  However, i n  t h a t  c a s e  
t h e  n o n - c o o p e r a t i v e  s e t t i n g  i s  enough t o  p r e s e r v e  t h e  m u l t i -  
c e n t e r  s t r u c t u r e .  
3 .  DECISION PROBLEM OF DEVELOPERS 
For  a  sys tem w i t h  many s u p p l i e r s  one  might  c o n s i d e r  modeling 
t h e  deve lopers '  p e r c e p t i o n  of s u p p l i e r  b e h a v i o r  i n  p r o b a b i l i s t i c  
t e rms  i n  a n a l o g y  w i t h  t h e  way s u p p l i e r s  a r e  assumed t o  p e r c e i v e  
cos tumer  b e h a v i o r  i n  s e c t i o n  2 .  I n s t e a d  w e  s h a l l  j u s t  i l l u s t r a t e  
t h e  n a t u r e  o f  t h e  deve lopers '  d e c i s i o n  problem i n  t h i s  s e c t i o n .  
We s h a l l  do t h i s  i n  t w o  s t a g e s .  F i r s t  w e  c o n s i d e r  t h e  s h o r t  t e r n  
- 
problem f o r  which t h e  a v a i l a b l e  f l o o r s p a c e ,  Z = Z i s  f i x e d  s o  j I 
t h a t  t h e  r e n t  l e v e l  i s  t h e  o n l y  d e c i s i o n  v a r i a b l e .  I n  a second s t s p  
w e  a l l o w  f o r  i n v e s t m e n t s  i n  new f l o o r s p a c e  and a s s o c i a t e d  i n f r a -  
s t r u c t u r e .  
Let t h e  p r o f i t  f u n c t i o n  which summarizes t h e  behavior  of de- 
ve lope r s  i n  c e n t e r  j be 
- 
where gi denotes  t h e  p r o f i t ,  Zi t h e  a l r e a d y  e x i s t i n g  f l o o r s p a c e ,  
2 - 2 
and Z - Z .  t h e  a d d i t i o n a l  f l oo r space  ob ta ined  through investment .  j I 
By F,-we denote t h e  investment  c o s t s  t ransformed t o  c o s t  p e r  t h e  
J 
same t ime u n i t  a s  t h e  one f o r  which t h e  p r o f i t  i s  c a l c u l a t e d .  
We do n o t  cons ider  n e i t h e r  ope ra t ion  and maintenance c o s t  nor t h e  
sunk c a ? i t a l  c o s t s .  
3 . 1  Shor t  term s e l e c t i o n  of r e n t  l e v e l  
- 
I n  t h e  s h o r t  term we pu t  Z - Z = 0 ,  and assume t h a t  F  ( 0 )  = 0 .  j j j 
Then assume t h a t  deve lopers  have t h e  fo l lowing  p e r c e p t i o n  
Supp l i e r s  pe rce ive  t h a t  ( A . l )  ho lds  bo th  ( A . 2 )  
with r ega rd  t o  W -dec i s ions  and y  - d e c i s i o n s .  j j 
From ( A . 2 )  and ( 1 4 )  we may w r i t e  f o r  W j < - f j l  s.n6 w.=@ 
I 
where F i s  de f ined  i n  ( 1  6 1 and B 
= lkf j F ~ W ~  j 
which shows t h a t  t h e  foorspace  e l a s t i c i t y  wi th  r e s p e c t  t o  t h e  
r e n t  l e v e l  i s  l a r g e r  t h a n  u n i t y .  This  imp l i e s  t h a t  a  f a l l i n g  
r i s  coupled wi th  an i n c r e a s i n g  W and W i n c r e a s e s f a s t  enough j j j 
f o r  f a l l i n g  r t o  b r i n g  about a  t o t a l  r a i s e  i n  p r o f i t s .  Hence, j 
we may conclude 
Remark 5: Given assumption (A.2) , the profit 
maximizing rent level, for fixed Zi and a >O, is 
J 
from (1 4' ) 
Observe that for rent levels below pi in Remark 5 the profit 
- 
function is g = r .Z and for r > 2 j 3 1' j ;, gj is monotonously falling. 
Hence, the developers' profit function is quasi-concave and con- 
tinuous in r+ . From (1 4 ' ) follows that if there is a minimum 
J 
W.-value for a center (a shop), rj 1 0  will belong to a compact 3 
set. This gives us the following proposition. 
Proposition 5: Let developers' perception be formed 
according to (A.21, let the profit function be given 
by (18), let i V  < Z and set w.=O. Then there exists a Nash j -  j 3 
equilibrium of rent levels for the multi-centre system. 
Consider now the case when w > 0 and use (A.2) and (14) j 
to obtain 
where F and B are defined as in (1 4 ' ) . We observe that (1 4) j j A 
is based on (11) and write W = W I *  Differentiating (14") j 
yields 
where X = B . /F .Ga and thus 1 +X = l/cj. Observing in (1 8) j 3 3 1' j 
that dg ./dr = d + r . (dk ./dr . ) , we can express the first and 
3 j j 3 3 1  
second order derivatives of (18) as 
where G = 1 + (1-a)X j* From (19) gj is positive and growing j 
for ri small. The function has an extremum for 
h 
Inserting r in the expression for g" yields a negative value if j j A 
Gi > 0 which is true for a < 1. Beyond the point ri the function 
J J 
is monotonically decreasing with an inflexion point at F, = 
[~G~/{(~-~)(I+X~)}I; if acl, (see Figure 2). j 
Figure 2. Developer income flow for short-term rent setting 
(Zj 4 Zj) 
Remark 6 :  Consider the same assumptions as in proposition 5 
with the exception that w > 0. Assume in addition that j - 
0 < - a < 1. Then there exists a Nash equilibrium of rent 
levels for the multi-center system. 
P r o o f :  As stated above, a < 1 ensures that g has the form j 
illustrated in Figure 3. Such a function is quasi-concave,, 
since it is monotonically increasing to the left of ; and j 
monotonically decreasing to the right. This establishes the 
statement in the remark. 
We may finally observe that the floorspace solution adhering 
to (20) is 
3.2 Deciding About Floorspace in Centers 
In this subsection we continue to examine the profit function 
in (18), and now we allow for investments which may increase the 
available floorspace. We do this by expressing r.W only in terms 
3  j
of floorspace by using (14) which is based on assumption (A.2). 
The profit function may in this case be written as 
gj = R. (W.) - F.(Z - f.) 3  3  3  3 
where Z = ma:<{ I?. ,Z . 1 and j I I 
R = aG.~/$0 for w.=O j I I 
A 
R = aM/$B(l+X.) - w.W for w.>O j I I j I 
according to (14) , (1 4 ' ) , and (1 4") . We first make the following 
observations 
Remark 7: For a: < 1 R is concave both when w =O and 
1) j j w > 0. j 
Proof: When w .=O we only have to observe from (7) that p. (W . )  
3  3 3  
is increasing and concave. Eence, R4 has the same properties. 
J 
For w.>O we calculate 2 R . / 3 V  = R! and a2~./ w2 = R1! as follows I I j I 3  j I 
2 
-a MX. [l+a +(l-a)X.] 
R" = 3  
3 2 ' < o  $B(l+X.) W 
3  j 
A 2 Observing f ron (21 ) that W = a MX ./w . $0 ( 1 +X . ) we can see that j 3  I 3  
W. < implies R! > 0, W = 9 .  implies R! = 0 and W > implies I j I j I I j j 
R! < 0. Izence, R. is a concave function. 3  3  
With regard to investment cost function F.(Z -Z . )  we can write 
3  j -3 
F.(w.-Z.) if we set F = o (or constant) for w < z 
3 3 3  j j - j .  We can also 
see that if f = 0, development can only occur if R !  (0) > F ' (0). j I j 
1)  From (8) we can see that if some part of the wage and overhead 
costs are proportional to floorspace, the w.>O; otherwise these 
costs are included in y?. 3  
3  
Proposition 6 below enumerates cases in which a non-cooperative 
equilibrium for developers exists. 
Proposition 6: Let (A.2) hold and let a < - 1. ~egard the 
developers in each zone as one decision maker selecting Zi 
a 
from a compact set, and let fi > 0. Assume also that 2 
- 
- J 
' (0-z j'. Rj ( 0 )  > F Then there exists a constellation of j 
floorspace decisions, z which form a Nash equilibrium 
if for each j F is a monotonically increasing function j 
which satisfies one of the following conditions: 
(i) convex everywhere; or 
(ii) concave with R' > 0, and R'. > F'. for W > f or j I -  J j - j' 
(iii) concave with > 0, R! < F'. for W > zj; or j I -  J j - 
(iv) S-shaped such that F" > 0 in the convex segment of j 
F and R' < F' in the concave segment; or j' j -  j 
(v) concave or convex with R concave and peaked. 1) j 
Outline of a Proof: According to Remark 7, R is a continuous j 
and concave function, and F is continuous by assumption. Hence, j 
gi is continuous. The additional requirement on gi (for an 
J J 
equilibrium to exist) is that g is quasi-concave. This is j 
satisfied if g is (I) monotonically increasing or (11.) mono- j 
tonically decreasing, or (111) monotonically increasing to a 
peak and thereafter decreasing, or (IV) gj is concave. 
For all cases the assumption R! (0) > F! (O-f . )  implies that 3 J 3 
every center considered is a potential location. 
In case (i) g is the difference between a concave and a j 
convex function. Hence, at least one of properties (I), (111) 
and (IV) is satisfied. 
In case (ii) g is the difference between two increasing j 
concave functions such that property (I) is satisfied. 
In case Ciiil g is monotonically increasing for W < f j j -  j 
and monotonically decreasing for W > Z since F!=O for W .  < 5 j 1' J I 1. 
Hence, property (111) is satisfied. 
In case (iv) property (111) is satisfied. For the convex seg- 
ment of r" we can use the result from case (i). For the subsequent j 
1 ) Cases (i) - (iv) are illustrated in Figure 3. 
segment of F we use the result from (iii) if R-' > 0 everywhere j j 
and from (v) if R is concave and peaked. j 
Figure 3: Illustration of case (i)-(iv) in Proposition 6 
In case (v) property (111) is obviously satisfied, since g j 
is the difference between a peaked concave and a monotonically 
increasing function. This completes the proof. 
As a final exercise we apply the result in Proposition 6 to 
the developer cost function which is used in Section 4 in which 
estimation procedures are described. In this case, 
gj has the form 
- 
where AZ = min{ 0 ,W .-Z . ) , and where o and e are positive j I I j j 
coefficients. The current unit cost of operating established 
infrastructure in center j is described by o 
1 
The coefficient 
e reflects the annualized investment cost with regard to infra- j 
structure of center j .  In Section 4 it is assumed that a center 
is provided with new infrastructure of the same standard as the 
original one. The unit cost related to the lowest standard is 
denoted by e and all other levels are expressed as ratios i > 1 j - 
of e so that 
with min{ i.) = I .  3 
It is obvious that the cost function in (22) satisfies the 
conditions in case (i) of Proposition 6. Hence, in (22) has 
a form which ensures the existence of a non-cooperative equilibrim. 
An illustration is given in Figure 4. 
Figure 4. Illustration of the profit function components in (22) 
4 . MODEL ESTIMATION AND IMPLEMENTATION 
With the development of the model structure in the preced- 
ing section, the model estimation and validation procedures are 
now examined, commencing with the customer model. Finally, 
suggestions for model implementation are discussed. 
4.1 Estimation and Validation of Customer Model 
Rather than obtaining parameters to describe the aggregate 
behavior of the customers via appropriate aggregation of the 
results of estimation of a model at the individual choice level, 
we estimate the aggregate model directly from aggregate data, 
with the inclusion of extra variance information when this can 
be shown to measurably improve the goodness of fit. In addition, 
a nested recursive approach is chosen, which separates the 
estimation into two phases, the first being to estimate the con- 
ditional probability p ik/j of customers in center j coming from 
zone i and being of income group k, and the second their choice 
probability p of shopping in center j. This has the advantage j 
that the constraint information is neatly divided into two 
distinct sets, the first for being just related to travel 
time and the travel plus shopping budget, and the second for 
Pi relating to the properties of the centers themselves (ROY, 
1 G83) . In this way, the model can be validated for pikIj using 
the travel information, before proceeding to the p phase. The j 
two phases -are now treated in order. 
For the estimation of pikIj, the average entropy S of the 
conditional probability distribution (Theil, 1972) is maximized 
in the form 
max - 
= (log pik/j -1) + 'W (1- ' Pik/j 
- mj ' Pik/j j 1 Pik/ j j ik j ik 
- - 
+ ' Aik (Oik-;pj Pik/j + 0 (t- ' pj Pik/j tijk) 
ik 3 ijk 
(ak Yj + C ijk 1 )  
where 6 is -the o b s e r v e d  customer distribution at j and the j 
other terms are given in ( 1 )  to (4) of section 2.1. The solu- 
tion comes out in the form of (5), and the goodness of fit may 
be computed as 
- log piklj)/(' Pj - Pik/j - log P i  - 1 - 1 1 1 where 
[ ( '  5 ' 'pik/j 
j ik j ik 
- 
'ik/ j (if available) is the observed conditional probability 
distribution. If the goodness fit is not satisfactory, it may 
be necessary to add further information on v a r i a n c e s  of shopping 
travel times and budgets. 
In order to estimate the customer choice probabilities p j 
it is necessary to include all relevant information on destina- 
tion q u a l i t y  via constraints, leaving the remaining effect of 
pure center s i z e  to be included as an unknown Rullback residual 
S pj, which can be shown (Roy, 1983) to be expressible as w?/(Iw?) , 3 3 
where the unknown customer scale coefficient a is determinedJby 
minimizing the Kullback divergence between the model distribu- 
tion p and the observed distribution 6 . A further point is j j 
the means of most efficient aggregation of the travel time and 
budget information from the p ik/j model. As discussed in Roy 
and Lesse (1983h), this is achieved by evaluating the Legendre 
transform or surplus form of the entropy of p ik/ j as 
A 
S = -Lpj Pik/j - log fijk) 
j ik 
which upon substitution from (5) and definition of "composite" 
h 
travel times t as j 
f j = - log ( L fijk)/~ 
ik 
yields the constraint to be applied to the p model as j 
The destination quality constraints should be experimented 
with in relation to improved goodness of fit. Typically, one 
may include "convenience" effects related to the amount of time 
m to park and complete the average shopping task in center j. j 
As this time may vary considerably for different persons at 
different times, a constraint on the average variance measure 
m (m) of m can also be applied, in terms of the observed vari- 2 
ances m (m.) at each center j. As proxy for "comfort", i is 
2 I j 
taken as the average building infrastructure investment inten- 
sity in j (normalized to unity for the poorest center), which is 
the only exogenous parameter directly connecting customer choice 
with developer decisions. This parameter is related to the 
investment cost function in (18). Also one may consider a 
binary variable nit given as unity if undercover parking exists 
J 
at j and zero otherwise. The problem for p then becomes j 
- min I = 1 Pj log (pj/p;) + R(1-L p.) - 0 ( E  + 6 1 p f j )  
'j j j I j j 
+ 5 (m - L p. m.) + p  (m2(m) - 
3 3 1 pj m2(mj)) j j 
+ n (i - L pj i.) + K (n-Z 
-4 3 , Pj nj) 1 
where the average values m, i and n are evaluated using the 
observed choice shares p S 
1. As p = w?/ ( Lw!) is an unknown in the 3 a 3  
above formulation, the problem must be salved simultaneously for 
the unknown multipliers and a together with the following 
* 
I = Min L 6 log (pj/p. ) 
a j j 3 
when f in (2) is given as exp - ( 5  mj j + p  m (m.) + rl i + K n.), 2 3 j 3 
the solution comes out as given in (7). If the goodness of fit, 
* 
computed as I - L pj log pj)), is unsatisfactory, further 
j 
quality constraints may be tried. The joint probabilities pijk 
are obtained via (4). The results may be seen to be of similar 
form to those arising from nested logit models. 
4.2 Checks on Behavior of Retailers and Developers 
With the customer model estimated as above, it is possible 
to obtain & and from Remark 5, or (19) together with $ from j j j 
Proposition 3, and check these with observed short-run values. 
The observations should be made at a time by which the system 
has settled down after a change in exogenous factors. The long- 
run behavior should be checked after the most recent addition 
to infrastructure supply. A key point to investigate is whether 
either the more "myopicw Proposition 3, or the more complete 
information implied by the result in (15), is preferable for the 
price-setting behavior of retailers. If the customer scale 
coefficient a turns out to be greater than unity, the model 
results should be checked against observations to see if the 
rent setting policy over time reasonably relates to developers 
capturing a certain proportion p of the transaction profits of j 
the retailers. 
4.3 Some Points on Implementation 
The sequence of operating the models in a forecasting con- 
text can be illustrated using a simple example. For instance, 
consider that undercover parking is to be introduced to one of 
the centers, say center g. Coefficient n would change to unity 
9 
in (2), leading to new customer choice patterns pi and retailer 
J 
prices for a 2 2  centers. After some time, this will change the j 
retailer floorspace demands fi and the rents h which will feed j j 
back to again modify the customer demand i and prices $ j j* 
Finally, there may be a tendency for further changes to infra- 
structure supply (e.g., by centers other than j) which may be 
evaluated as shown in section 3.2. The effects of this would 
then feed back to affect retailer demand 9, and rents A,, after 
J J 
which customer demand 6 and prices would adjust further. j j 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
A three-level leader-follower model has been introduced, in 
which the suppliers, acting as oligopolists at each center j, set 
their prices and floorspace demands according to perceived res- 
ponse by customers. At the next level, the developers, again 
acting as oligopolists at each center, make their short-run rent 
decisions and longer-run capacity expansion decisions depending 
on their perceptions of response by the retailers. A future 
challenge is to include the retailer decisions and developer 
decisions in a formal probabilistic framework (as already done 
for the customer decisions), with observations on system behavior 
and appropriate transmission of information between the different 
levels implicitly describing the perceptions of each group about 
the others' possible actions. To achieve this purpose, further 
developments will need to be made in the scope of use of infor- 
mation theory. In the meantime, the models developed above can 
be fully tested, to determine if it is really necessary in 
practice to introduce such increased complexity. 
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